

# Summary

## Established in the Netherlands, but it's not home

Initial findings of the Survey integratie migranten (Survey on Migrant Integration (sim2020))

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Original title:  
Gevestigd, maar niet thuis

# Summary

## 1 Initial findings of the SIM2020

In this report, we present a selection of findings from the *Survey integratie migranten* (Survey on Migrant Integration (SIM2020)). This survey was carried out among individuals with a Turkish (n = 696), Moroccan (n = 570), Surinamese (n = 638), Caribbean-Dutch (n = 592), Somali (n = 519), Iranian (n = 855) and Polish (n = 682) background in 2020. A comparison group of individuals without a migration background (n = 771) was surveyed too. We define individuals with a migration background as first and second-generation migrants. Individuals with a Polish background are an exception to this definition. In the SIM2020, they are all first-generation migrants and came to the Netherlands to live after 1 January 2004. This was the year when Poland became part of the European Union (EU) and Poles were free to establish themselves in the Netherlands.

The SIM2020 was funded by the *Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid* (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (szw)). As requested by the ministry, the *Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau* (Netherlands Institute for Social Research (scp)) set up this survey, put together the questionnaire, supervised the fieldwork and prepared the database. When doing this, the scp worked with *Labyrinth Onderzoek & Advies*, which carried out the fieldwork, and also with the *Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek* (Statistics Netherlands (cbs)), which drew the sample, applied the weighting and linked a number of index data to the database.

The SIM2020 was set up against the background of a multidimensional and multidirectional integration concept. In other words, information was gathered about positions on a number of dimensions (being the structural, socio-cultural and political dimensions) and about experiences with inclusion and exclusion. Within the SIM2020, research was also done on individual resources of help that influence both positions on the dimensions and also inclusion and exclusion. This report is descriptive and provides an initial introduction to the data collected in the SIM2020.


## 2 Summary: the most important findings

### Language and education

The groups surveyed differ widely in the average length of their residence in the Netherlands and also in the percentage of individuals who are second-generation migrants. In this light, it is no surprise that the group consisting of individuals with a Polish background (who have been living in the Netherlands for a relatively short period of time and are all first-generation migrations) has the most problems with the Dutch language (see Figure 1). Where the traditional groups are concerned, individuals with a Turkish background have problems with the Dutch language proportionally more frequently.

Figure 1

Does not speak any Dutch / often finds it difficult to have a conversation in Dutch, by migrant group, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)




Source: SCP/CBS (SIM'20)

There are big differences in level of education between the groups. More than 40% of Somali-Dutch citizens left education after finishing primary school. A higher number of migrants in the Iranian group have been educated at *hbo* (higher professional) and *wo* (university) level than individuals without a migration background have. The second generation is significantly better educated than the first generation is. Big differences are particularly evident between the generations in the Turkish, Moroccan and Somali groups. These point to a clear improvement in the level of education achieved. Figure 2 shows the percentage of individuals with an *mbo* (senior secondary vocational) education background or higher, by group and generation.

Figure 2

Level of education at *mbo* (senior secondary vocational education) level and higher, by migrant group and generation, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)




Source: SCP/CBS (SIM'20)

### Health less good among the four traditional groups, particularly among the elderly

Individuals with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Caribbean-Dutch background are often less healthy than individuals without a migration background. As the age increases, the percentage of individuals who perceive their health to be good decreases sharply in the four traditional groups. Poles often have good health, including those aged 45 and older. This cannot be viewed in isolation from the fact that they came to the Netherlands as labour migrants to do work that required them to be healthy. It is also conceivable that individuals who have health problems return to Poland relatively more often.

Figure 3

Health perceived as (very) good, by migrant group and age, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)




Source: SCP/CBS (SIM'20)

Individuals with a migration background (with the exception of individuals with a Somali background) have poor mental health far more often than individuals without a migration background. This particularly applies to individuals with a Turkish, Iranian and Polish background (see Figure 4). Unlike perceived health, there is less of a difference between age groups. Young people have poor mental health too, which would primarily seem to be the case in the Caribbean-Dutch and Polish groups and among individuals without a migration background.

Figure 4

Poor mental health (MH1 < 40), by migrant group and age, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)




Source: SCP/CBS (SIM2020)

### Many individuals with a migration background are religious

Many individuals with a Turkish, Moroccan or Somali background are religious. Many Poles are religious too. This applies to Iranian-Dutch citizens to a far lesser extent. They are similar to individuals without a migration background in this respect (Figure 5). Religious Turkish, Moroccan and Somali-Dutch citizens are Muslims almost without exception. In these groups, we saw few differences between the first and second generations. Religious Poles are Christians. The same applies for Caribbean-Dutch citizens who are religious. Approximately half of religious Surinamese are Christians; more than one-tenth are Muslims and approximately 40% are Hindus.

Figure 5

People who are religious, by migrant group and generation, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)




Source: SCP/CBS (SIM'20)

### Big differences in paid work, second generation often working

In the groups surveyed, net participation is the lowest among individuals with a Somali background in general and Somali women in particular. Individuals with a Polish background often have paid work. Their net participation is higher than that of individuals without a migration background. There are spectacular differences in labour participation rates between the first and second generations of Turkish, Moroccan and Somali groups. We also saw big differences in education between the generations in these groups.

Figure 6

Net participation, by migrant group and generation, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)



Source: SCP/CBS (SIM'20)

Where the increase in labour participation is concerned, it is important to bear in mind that many employees with a migration background have temporary jobs. This applies particularly for employees with a Somali or Iranian background. Young people and members of the second generation often have temporary positions too.

### Individuals with a migration background often have a mixed circle of contacts

Approximately half of individuals with a Turkish or Moroccan background have a mixed circle of friends and acquaintances (Figure 7). In this context, this means they have frequent contacts with both individuals from the migrant group and individuals without a migration background. This percentage is the highest among young people in these groups. In comparison, individuals with a Surinamese or Caribbean-Dutch background more often have a circle of friends and acquaintances who predominantly consist of individuals without a migration background. Individuals with a Turkish, Somali and Polish migration background most often have a circle of contacts that predominantly consists of members of their ethnic group.


Individuals without a migration background have far less contact with individuals with a migration background than that applicable between individuals with a migration background and individuals without a migration background. So, individuals without a



migration background often have fewer social contacts with individuals of a different ethnicity than individuals with a migration background do.

Figure 7

Ethnic signature of contacts in the circle of friends and acquaintances, by migrant group, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)




Source: SCP/CBS (SIM'20)

The boundaries of a group are not bridged by entering into contacts alone; a more emotional-affective component also plays a part. The groups surveyed differ considerably in the extent to which they identify with their ethnic group and as Dutch (see Figure 8). Individuals with a Turkish background traditionally identify more strongly with their ethnic group. This is also confirmed by the SIM2020, in which a relatively big group predominantly feel that they are Turkish. More than 40% combine this with a strong identification as Dutch. The Somali group is very similar to the Turkish group in this respect. The majority of individuals with a Polish background predominantly feel that they are Polish. The Surinamese and Caribbean-Dutch citizens group is a relatively big group and consists of individuals who predominantly feel that they are Dutch citizens.

Figure 8

Identification with their ethnic group and as Dutch, by migrant group, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)




Source: SCP/CBS (SIM'20)

### Value orientations: differences of opinion about gay marriage in particular

There are relatively few differences between individuals with and without a migration background where views about the roles of men and women are concerned. There is broad support for the idea that it is just as important for boys and girls to earn their own money. Approximately one-fifth of individuals with a Turkish, Moroccan and Somali background do not support this statement; this figure is slightly higher than in the other groups. We see big differences in support for gay marriage. This is lower among individuals with a Turkish, Moroccan and Somali background than in the other groups. Support for gay marriage is also relatively low among Poles. An overview of support for both views is shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9

Value orientations by migrant group, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)




Source: SCP/CBS (SIM'20)

### Politics: the more settled an individual feels, the less representation is perceived and the lower institutional trust is

Individuals from the refugee groups in particular feel that their interests are represented properly in the Dutch parliament. Far fewer individuals in the other migrant groups share this opinion. This is particularly true of Surinamese-Dutch citizens. Another important finding is that the representation perceived is limited among members of the second generation. So, the more settled a group is, the lower the representation perceived is.

Figure 10

Support for the statement that the interests of individuals like me are represented properly in the Dutch parliament, by migrant group, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)




Source: SCP/CBS (SIM'20)

We see that the same applies in respect of institutional trust (see Figure 11). The vast majority of individuals with a Somali and Iranian background have a (very) high level of trust in the Dutch government. This applies significantly less for individuals with a Surinamese or Caribbean-Dutch background. With the exception of the Caribbean-Dutch group, members of the second generation often have less trust in the Dutch government than individuals in the first generation do. There is a particularly big difference between the generations in the Moroccan and Somali groups.

Figure 11

A (very) high level of trust in the Dutch government, by migrant group and generation, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)




Source: SCP/CBS (SIM'20)

### Perceived discrimination: big differences between old and new groups

Individuals with a Surinamese or Caribbean-Dutch background are particularly of the opinion that individuals with a migration background are often discriminated against (a lot) in the Netherlands (see Figure 12). A significant percentage of Turkish and Moroccan-Dutch citizens share this opinion as well. This applies to members of the refugee groups surveyed to a lesser extent. There is a big difference between the generations in this respect. Second-generation Somalis and Iranians feel that ethnic discrimination is the case far more than first-generation Somalis and Iranians do. They differ little from the second generation of other groups in this respect. These findings correspond with findings about political representation and trust.

Figure 12

A (very) high level of discrimination in the Netherlands against individuals with a migration background, by migrant group and generation, individuals aged 15 and older, 2020 (in percentages)



Source: SCP/CBS (SIM'20)

Where discrimination that individuals have experienced themselves is concerned, Surinamese and Caribbean-Dutch citizens again often report discrimination. Polish-Dutch citizens often have personal experience of discrimination as well. There are limited differences between the other groups. Again, there are differences between the generations: members of the second generation state that they have been discriminated against themselves (very) often more frequently than members of the first generation do.

### Individuals with a migration background are positive about a diverse society

It is a demographic fact that the Netherlands is now a multi-ethnic society. However, opinions about this vary significantly. With the exception of individuals with a Polish background, the vast majority of individuals with a migration background believe it is good for society to consist of people from different cultures. Enthusiasm for a culturally-diverse society is less widespread in individuals without a migration background.

Opinions of the Netherlands as a hospitable country also vary for individuals with a migration background. Individuals without a migration background and individuals who we rank among the new groups (individuals with an Iranian, Somali and Polish background) have this opinion significantly more often than members of the traditional groups (individuals with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Caribbean-Dutch background) do. Again,

second-generation individuals are most often of the opinion that the Netherlands is not very hospitable to individuals with a migration background. This applies for all the migrant groups surveyed.

### 3 Conclusions

There are big differences in the migration history, length of residence and percentage of first and second generation individuals in the migrant groups surveyed. As such, it is no surprise that big differences exist between these groups. However, the description of the position of the migrant groups that emerges from the SIM2020 facilitates a number of more general conclusions. It is helpful to distinguish between the four more established groups and the three new groups and also to divide up the latter groups into two refugee groups and a group consisting of individuals with a Polish migration background.

#### Four established groups: socio-economic progress but a lot of unease

We rank individuals with a Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese and Caribbean-Dutch migration background as members of the more established groups. A substantial number of these individuals were born in the Netherlands and many of the first-generation members of these groups have been in the Netherlands for some time now. Because of this, just a relatively small percentage of them have problems with the Dutch language. An improved position for the second generation is particularly evident in terms of education and the labour market. The descriptive data collected does not make it possible to establish whether the second generation has the same education and labour market position as individuals without a migration background and similar characteristics. So-called proportionality analyses could be used to obtain this information. However, previous studies do show that the proportional position of the second generation of these groups is heading in the right direction (Huijnk 2020). This is not to say that there are no longer any issues with the labour market position of members of these groups because an important part of the increased net participation has been realised in the form of temporary positions. Amongst other things, there is also a high level of welfare dependency among individuals with a migration background and various studies have clearly shown that discrimination is impeding progress in the labour market position of individuals with a migration background (Thijssen et al. 2019).

Naturally, each of the four established groups has its own profile. The Turkish-Dutch group still has a relatively strong focus on contacts within the migrant group and many identify themselves as such. At the same time, we are often seeing a 'double' orientation: there are frequent contacts with individuals without a migration background and individuals in the Turkish-Dutch group feel that they are both Turkish and Dutch. In comparison with the Turkish-Dutch group, the Moroccan-Dutch group is slightly more focused on contacts outside the migrant group, but these differences are not big (any more). Another similarity is that the majority of individuals with a Turkish and Moroccan background are Muslims, a religion that has strong support among the first and second generations.

Surinamese and Caribbean-Dutch citizens focus more on individuals without a migration background and on the Netherlands in their contacts and identification. They cross group boundaries more often, as evidenced by the fact that their circle of friends is mixed or consists predominantly of individuals without a migration background.

The established groups are characterised by their rootedness in the Netherlands via different aspects of their existence. However, unease is big among members of these groups too. This is evident from our findings about representation, institutional trust and perceived discrimination. It would seem that the stronger individuals are rooted, the greater their unease and sense of exclusion are. This particularly applies for individuals with a Surinamese and Caribbean-Dutch background. This is a little surprising because strong feelings of exclusion are expected in Muslim groups in particular (see Andriessen et al. 2020). At the same time, findings about perceived discrimination among the Surinamese and Caribbean-Dutch groups cannot be viewed in isolation from the emergence of the Black Lives Matter movement in the Netherlands. It is also important to note that a trend for an ever higher percentage of Surinamese and Caribbean-Dutch citizens to experience ethnic discrimination has been evident for some time (Huijnk and Andriessen 2016).

The 'strongly rooted - great unease' mechanism particularly applies for second-generation members of the groups in question. They are, almost without exception, most gloomy about the political system, the significance of discrimination and the possibilities that exist for society in the Netherlands to become culturally diverse.

These findings support the broad idea that underlies the integration paradox: individuals who are most 'rooted' experience discrimination most (see Geurts et al. 2020). The background to the above consists of a number of factors. Increased integration and participation results in increased exposure to exclusion: in the labour market or in education, for example. Another factor is the fact that the second generation is more aware of political and social discussion about integration, migration, racism and Islam. All this feeds pessimism about the possibilities and opportunities open to individuals with a migration background in the Netherlands. Also, members of the second generation feel the weight of this even more because they were born and bred in the Netherlands and feel that they are citizens of and part of society in the Netherlands. This can be an incentive for them to protest and speak out against exclusion, as has happened in recent years in the *Zwarte Pieten* (Black Petes) discussion and Black Lives Matter protests, for example.

### Two refugee groups: waning migrant optimism?

Any form of categorisation gives rise to questions and this survey is no exception. There are big differences between the Somali and Iranian groups in terms of socio-economic position, social contact pattern and religious orientation. However, we still group them together here because they show a number of notable similarities in respect of a number of subjects. This is particularly the case as regards the extent to which they experience discrimination, their views on the political system, their high level of institutional trust and their views on where the Netherlands stands vis-à-vis individuals with a migration background. Their views on these subjects are remarkably positive in comparison with those of



members of the more established groups. This is characteristic of refugee groups; for example, we see this in Syrians who have arrived in the Netherlands in recent years. Their frame of reference is still very much their country of origin, where the nature of the political systems there prompted them to flee. This comparison colours their thinking about (opportunities in) the Netherlands and how Dutch politics work. Our findings indicate that the positive assessment of this country is not shared by second-generation Somali and Iranian-Dutch citizens. They are often far gloomier about the extent to which they feel represented by politicians, trust institutions less and experience the discrimination that takes place in the Netherlands far more often than first-generation members do. They are similar to the second generation of the established groups in this respect.

### Labour migrants from Poland: high labour participation, often with poor psychological health and discrimination experiences

Polish respondents in the SIM2020 can justifiably be identified as a new group: more than half of them came to the Netherlands after 2011 and the SIM2020 focuses solely on first-generation migrants. These are predominantly individuals who have come to the Netherlands for work reasons. Their labour participation is high: they are in employment more often than individuals without a migration background are. Their good perceived health is noticeable, even in the higher age categories. However, a significant percentage of Poles have poor psychological health; this is particularly true of the younger individuals in this group. Some members of this group do not speak Dutch because of the relatively short period of time they have been residing in the Netherlands. They often spend their free time with other Poles and many identify themselves primarily as Polish. Besides the short period of time they have been resident in the Netherlands for, this is probably also due to their residence intention, which is to return to Poland. Individuals with a Polish background have their reservations about gay marriage and a culturally-diverse society. Few of them feel represented by the Dutch parliament. However, their level of institutional trust is fairly high in comparison with other migrant groups. Many Polish-Dutch citizens are of the opinion that individuals with a migration background are often discriminated against in the Netherlands. The percentage of individuals who have often experienced discrimination themselves is relatively high as well.

## 4 Finally

The description of the positions of individuals on three dimensions – structural, socio-cultural and political – shows how big the variation is between and within groups. It also shows that different objectives can be attached to integration policy. In the four big established groups, the socio-economic disadvantages – traditionally, the reference point for integration policy – have not disappeared but have been joined by another issue. Members of the established groups and the second generation often feel excluded and are gloomy about the social climate as regards the opportunities open to migrants and the openness that exists for society to actually become culturally diverse. They are established but do not

feel that the Netherlands is home. The assumption that an increase in level of education and increased economic participation would contribute to social and political inclusion is actually far more complex in practice. Aspects like perceived exclusion, the feeling that individuals with a migration background do not have the same opportunities and, ultimately, do not belong, would seem to have an impact on issues like social cohesion, political representation and institutional trust. This again highlights the fact that integration processes cannot be viewed in isolation from discrimination and exclusion.

The findings obtained point to a number of challenges for policy. How can policy help individuals with a migration background (start to) feel part of society and the political system? The policy needed must focus on socio-economic participation and also include groups and make it clear that they 'belong' in the Netherlands. Besides 'equipping' migrants (geared towards improving their knowledge of the Dutch language and their education position, amongst other things) and ensuring 'accessibility' (to the labour and property market, for example), integration policy should also promote trust; both trust in institutions and trust between population groups.

Issues like social cohesion, institutional trust and representation are complex, both in terms of the analysis of factors and as regards offering reference points for policy. The scp is currently conducting in-depth research on the backgrounds of political representation and institutional trust among individuals with a migration background. Explicit attention is being given to the connection with perceived exclusion. The aim is for this in-depth research to generate additional concrete points of reference for policy. Naturally, inclusion and trust issues are not limited to individuals with a migration background but apply in society as a whole. Research on this – within the scp and beyond – indicates that individuals who do not feel recognised and acknowledged are more likely to have low institutional trust and feel that they are under-represented in politics. Formulated in more general terms, these individuals would seem to have feelings of social marginalisation (Gidron and Hall 2020). To improve insight into the backgrounds to the above among various population groups, the scp will carry out various studies as part of the programme *Representatie en vertrouwen* (Representation and trust) in the years ahead. We see these studies as building blocks that will give more of an insight into the backgrounds of perceived social and political exclusion and their consequences for behaviour. The scp programme *De diverse bevolking van Nederland* (The diverse population of the Netherlands) will generate other building blocks, which primarily focus on the connection between the diversity of the population and social cohesion.

Integration issues are increasingly being framed as social issues. We also see this in the use of the word 'inclusion' in the names given to policy departments and knowledge institutes rather than the word 'integration'. Although there are good reasons for this change, it should not be forgotten that the 'old' integration issues still exist and continue to deserve the attention of policy.