

Summary, conclusions and policy implications

Annual Integration Report 2013

Labour market position of migrant groups in times of economic recession

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The last fifteen years have been marked by intensive and often fierce debate about the integration of migrant groups. This debate has generally focused on the sociocultural aspects of integration, as expressed among other things in questions about the extent and significance of cultural differences, the role of Islam and interethnic contacts and relations. The policy debate in recent years has also been heavily dominated by the question of sociocultural integration. This is a major difference compared with the 1980s and 1990s, when integration was linked mainly to disadvantage in education and on the labour market. Those topics have receded to the background today, but given the economic downturn in recent years it is questionable whether this is appropriate. There are clear signs that the economic crisis is pushing the labour market position of migrant groups in the wrong direction. In order to obtain a clear picture of this situation, it was decided to devote this *Annual Integration Report (Jaarrapport integratie)* entirely to the labour market and income position of migrant groups. This report is therefore different from earlier Integration Reports, which focused attention on a range of different topics, such as education, crime, housing and sociocultural position.

Box 5.1 Labour force, unemployment and net participation rate

The employed and unemployed labour force together constitute the total labour force (aged 15-65 years). Persons with a job for at least twelve hours per week are included in the employed labour force. The unemployed labour force comprises persons who do not have a job for at least twelve hours per week but who are actively seeking and are available for such a job. The *unemployment rate* indicates the share of the labour force included in the unemployed labour force. The *net participation rate* describes the proportion of the total population aged between 15 and 65 years who form part of the employed labour force.

The non-labour force comprises all persons aged between 15 and 65 years without a job for at least twelve hours per week and not actively seeking one. This is a diverse group, often consisting of people with an incapacity for work, people who do not work because they are looking after a family or household, and pupils or students, at least those without work (for at least twelve hours per week) and not actively seeking such a job. People who do not form part of the labour force are left out of consideration when calculating the unemployment rate.

Unemployment

High unemployment among migrant groups; 28% youth unemployment

The unemployment rate among non-Western migrants was more than three times as high as in the native Dutch population in 2012 (table S.1); 16% of non-Western migrants are unemployed, compared with 5% of native Dutch. Youth unemployment is substantially higher still: more than a quarter (28%) of young non-Western migrants (aged 15-24 years) are unemployed, compared with one in ten of their native Dutch counterparts. Youth unemployment in the different migrant groups ranges between 25% and 29%, except in the Moroccan migrant population, where it reaches 37%. Unemployment is higher in the second generation than the first generation, except among Antillean migrants. The unemployment rate among non-Western women (16%) is the same as for non-Western men (15%). The unemployment rate is relatively low among men of Turkish background (12%) and women of Surinamese origin (13%).

The figures for the second quarter of 2013 are in line with the trend in recent years, with the unemployment rate among non-Western migrants rising further to 17.8%. The unemployment rate is by far the highest among the Somali group: 37% of the labour force in this group are unemployed (2012 figures). The unemployment rate among those of Afghan origin is 21% and among those of Iraqi background 20%; 13% of Iranian migrants in the labour force are unemployed.

Table S.1

Unemployed labour force, large migrant groups, gender, age, generation, 2012 (in percentages)

	Turkish	Moroccan	Surinamese	Antillean	other non-Western	non-Western total	native Dutch
total	15	20	14	16	15	16	5
men	12	19	15	17	15	15	5
women	18	21	13	16	15	16	5
15-24 years	26	37	27	29	25	28	10
25-44 years	12	16	15	15	15	15	4
45-64 years	15	16	9	12	11	11	5
1st generation	12	17	12	19	15	15	-
2nd generation	18	25	18	12	13	18	-

Source: CBS (EBB'12)


Rapid rise in unemployment increases disadvantage relative to natives

The current recession is affecting non-Western migrants more severely than Dutch natives. The unemployment rate among non-Western migrants has risen sharply, from 9% in 2008 to 16% in 2012. Over the last five years, youth unemployment (15-24 years) has

almost doubled in the migrant population, from 15% to 28% in 2012, its highest level this century. Youth unemployment is also increasing in the native population, but more slowly than among migrants. As a result, the gap between migrant groups and natives has widened; migrants are being harder hit by the economic downturn (figures S.1a and S.1b).

Figure S.1

Unemployed labour force, non-Western migrants and Dutch natives, total group (figure S.1a) and young people aged 15-24 years (figure S.1b), 2001-2012 (in percentages and difference in percentage points)



Source: CBS (EBB'01-'12)

Migrant school-leavers more often unemployed

The higher unemployment rate among young members of migrant groups is also reflected among school-leavers. Eighteen months after completing senior secondary vocational education, 19% of non-Western migrants are unemployed, compared with 5% of their native Dutch counterparts (figures for 2010-2012). The 'other non-Western migrants' (23%) and those of Moroccan background (21%) are relatively most often unemployed. We find the same picture among higher education graduates; eighteen months after graduating, 15% of non-Western graduates from higher professional education are unemployed, compared with 6% of native Dutch students. The unemployment rate among non-Western university graduates is lower, at 10%, but is still double that of native Dutch university graduates (5%). Graduates of Turkish and Moroccan background are more often unemployed than graduates of Surinamese and Antillean origin.

Non-Western school dropouts vulnerable on the labour market

Premature school-leavers have left secondary school without a basic qualification in general, pre-university or secondary vocational education. Our data show that, around eighteen months after dropping out, a sizeable proportion (a third) of premature school-leavers say they have taken up a course or training programme. With the exception of migrants of Turkish background, the share of premature school-leavers who return to education is slightly higher among non-Western migrants than among the native Dutch. First-generation Antillean migrants, in particular, relatively often (50%) return to education.

Those who do not return to education have few opportunities on the labour market. 38% of premature school-leavers of non-Western origin are still unemployed eighteen months after dropping out. Those of Moroccan origin, in particular, are very frequently unemployed (59%). 41% of Antillean dropouts from senior secondary vocational education are unemployed, 35% of those of Turkish origin and 27% of those of Surinamese background; by comparison, 18% of native Dutch dropouts from senior secondary vocational education are unemployed.

The number of young migrants dropping out of education has in fact fallen in recent years (from more than 52,000 in the 2005/06 school year to just over 36,000 in 2011/12). If we look at the sizes of the origin groups among school-leavers, we find that approximately 2,100 school-leavers of Moroccan origin, for example, dropped out in the 2011/12 school year.

Non-Western students in vocational training have more difficulty finding internships

21% of non-Western students on school-based vocational training programmes experience problems finding an internship, compared with 15% of their native Dutch peers. Students of Moroccan origin most often have difficulties finding an internship (24%), while those of Surinamese background report this problem least often (17%). The gap between native Dutch and non-Western senior secondary vocational students narrowed between 2004 and 2012.

Non-Western vocational training and higher education graduates harder hit by crisis

The unemployment rate is rising faster among non-Western migrants who have graduated from senior secondary vocational and higher professional education than among their native counterparts. The economic situation makes it more difficult for non-Western school-leavers to find a job than for native Dutch graduates, even where they have obtained a higher education qualification.

(Young) migrants more often unemployed even when other characteristics are the same

A logical explanation for the higher unemployment rate among migrant groups is the lower education level and the larger number of young people within these groups. Education does undoubtedly play a role: the unemployment rate among highly educated

migrants is lower than among those with a lower education level. The weak position of early school-leavers who do not return to education also underlines the importance of education. Yet differences in education level and other characteristics (courses studied, age, residential area, unemployment history, final examination marks) explain only a very small amount of the difference in the unemployment rate between migrants and Dutch natives. Several analyses were performed for this report: for the total group, for young people and for recent graduates of senior secondary vocational and higher education. All these analyses show that most of the differences remain unexplained. This means that migrants are still more often unemployed than Dutch natives even when all other characteristics are the same. The gap between them is thus due to other factors that were not included in the analyses. These factors might include less intensive and less effective jobseeking behaviour by (young) migrants and discrimination.

Paid work

Just over half (53%) the non-Western population aged 15-65 years are in paid work. The net participation rate of the native Dutch population is substantially higher (70%). The net participation rate is lowest among non-Western migrants of Moroccan origin (46%) and highest among those of Surinamese origin (61%). 60% of non-Western men have a job, while fewer than half of non-Western women do (46%). The female participation rate is considerably lower than this among women of Turkish (40%) and particularly Moroccan (35%) origin. The participation rate of women with a Surinamese background (59%) is not much lower than that of native Dutch women (table S.2).

Table S.2

Working labour force (net participation rate: paid work for at least twelve hours per week) in the large migrant groups, total and by sex, 2012 (in percentages)

	Turkish	Moroc- can	Surina- mese	Antil- lean	other non-Western	non-Western total	native Dutch
total	52	46	61	57	52	53	70
men	64	56	64	60	58	60	76
women	40	35	59	53	45	46	63

Source: CBS (EBB '12)


Only 26% of the Somali group are in work. The figure for Afghan migrants is 42%, and for Iraqis 39%. These refugee groups are thus at a very great disadvantage on the Dutch labour market. With a net participation rate of 60%, the Iranian group are doing much better; this figure is comparable with that for the Surinamese group.

Participation rate of migrant groups falls due to economic crisis

The net participation rate of non-Western migrants has barely increased since the start of this century. In 2001, 52% were in paid employment; in 2012 the figure was 53%. The net participation rate of non-Western migrants has declined by four percentage points since 2008. Over the same period, the share of the native Dutch population in paid work has remained stable. This means that the gap between the native Dutch and migrants has widened again in the recent (crisis) years (figure S.2).

Figure S.2

Net participation rate of non-Western migrants and Dutch natives, 2001-2012 (in percentages)



Source: CBS (EBB'01 -'12)


Female participation rate increasing

The net female participation rate increased between 2001 and 2012, while the male participation rate fell over the same period. In 2001, 42% of non-Western women were in paid work, compared with 46% in 2012. Over the same period, the share of non-Western men in paid work fell from 62% to 60%. (The male participation rate also fell in the native Dutch population – from 78% to 76% - and increased among women, from 53% in 2001 to 63% in 2012.)

With the exception of the Antillean group, the female participation rate has increased in all migrant groups (figure S.3). The increase was most pronounced among women of Turkish and other non-Western origin.

Figure S.3

Net participation rate of non-Western migrants by sex, 2001 and 2012 (in percentages)



Source: CBS (EBB'01 and EBB'12)

Young migrants predominantly on flexible employment contracts

More than a quarter (28%) of non-Western employees are on flexible contracts, compared with 17% of Dutch natives. The four largest migrant groups are less dependent on flexible employment contracts than the refugee groups. Young people are frequently employed on flexible contracts; this applies for more than half of young Dutch natives and more than two out of three young non-Western migrants. The figure rises to three-quarters for young migrants of Turkish and Surinamese origin.

The share of migrants with flexible jobs is fairly stable, though the number of flexible employment contracts increased among Dutch natives between 2001 and 2012, so that the difference on this point between non-Western migrants and Dutch natives has narrowed over time. The share of young non-Westerners with a flexible employment contract increased sharply in the period 2001-2012, from just over half to more than two-thirds. There was also a sharp increase in flexible employment among young Dutch natives, from 33% to 54%.

Young graduate migrants also often on flexible contracts

The fact that young migrants are often forced into flexible employment is also echoed in the findings of research among those who have recently graduated from senior secondary vocational and higher education. eighteen months after graduating, senior secondary vocational education graduates of non-Western origin are more often employed on temporary contracts than their native Dutch counterparts. The difference is widest for Moroccan graduates: 51% are still on temporary contracts eighteen months after leaving senior secondary vocational education (Dutch natives: 36%). The group of

Surinamese origin are virtually indistinguishable from Dutch natives (38% on temporary contracts).

Higher education graduates from migrant groups also more often have temporary jobs than their native Dutch counterparts, though the differences are less pronounced than in senior secondary vocational education.

There has been a marked increase in the number of recent graduates on temporary contracts in the last few years, especially those qualifying from vocational training (a doubling within the space of a decade). The share of temporary contracts is structurally higher among non-Western migrants than among Dutch natives, and also rises more quickly when the economy is weak. The share of higher education graduates on temporary contracts, both non-Western migrants and Dutch natives, has risen sharply in recent years. This trend has been clear for higher professional education graduates since as long ago as 2001/02, while the trend began rising for university graduates from 2007/08. There are no significant differences in the increase in the share of temporary jobs between Dutch natives and migrant graduates.


Occupational status of migrant groups rising

Non-Western migrants are more often employed in elementary and low-grade occupations (42%) and less often in more senior and academic occupations (24%) than Dutch natives (28% and 34%, respectively). Education level is an important factor influencing the distribution across occupational levels, and the share of the Surinamese, Antillean and – especially – Iranian groups in high-level occupations is therefore considerable. By contrast, those of Turkish and Moroccan origin and the other refugee groups are relatively often employed in low-status jobs.

The share of people employed in senior and academic occupations increased in all groups between 2001 and 2012. We find no clear relationship with the economic cycle and the present crisis. The trend for migrants to move up the jobs ladder has been relatively most pronounced among migrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin. It is also interesting that nearly 30% of the second generation in the working population have higher-status jobs, greatly narrowing the gap compared with the native Dutch workforce (see figure S.4).

Figure S.4

Employed labour force with high-status jobs, 2001-2012 (in percentages)



Source: CBS (EBB'01 and EBB'12)

Migrants more likely to have temporary jobs; no difference in occupational level and salary where characteristics are the same

Working migrants have flexible jobs more often than Dutch natives, even allowing for key characteristics such as education level and age – though the differences in job level between natives and non-Western migrants are (largely) attributable to differences in such characteristics. It is thus not the case that migrants work in jobs for which they are over-qualified or receive a lower income than natives with the same characteristics. Migrants less often have (permanent) work than natives with the same characteristics, but there are no differences in terms of occupation level and salary. If we look at graduates from senior secondary vocational and higher education, we again see that the disadvantage of non-Western migrants is concentrated in the area of finding work, permanent or otherwise. Once they have a job, there are no significant differences in the shares with jobs for which they are qualified or in terms of salaries. The majority of both native Dutch and non-Western graduates who are in work were employed in jobs which were at least at their qualification level in the period 2010-2012, and this applies both for senior secondary vocational education and higher education.

Self-employment more common among refugee groups

15% of the native Dutch working population are self-employed. Among the major migrant groups, those of Turkish origin are most often self-employed (14%), those of Moroccan origin least often (8%). Migrants from the refugee groups are self-employed more often than those of Turkish origin, but also more often than Dutch natives; no fewer than one in five Afghan and Iranian migrants are self-employed.

Self-employment has increased since 2001 among both Dutch natives and non-Western migrants, from 13% to 15% in the former case and from 8% to 12% in the latter group.

Benefits and income

Non-Western migrants six times more likely to be dependent on social assistance benefit

There are wide differences between origin groups when it comes to benefit dependency. Non-Western migrants are six times more likely to be dependent on social assistance benefit than Dutch natives (12% versus 2%). Fewer Turkish and Surinamese migrants are in receipt of social assistance benefit (9%) than in the Antillean (12%) and Moroccan groups (14%). Benefit dependency in the refugee groups is even higher: one in five people of Iranian origin (20%), one in four of Afghan origin (24%), one in three Iraqi (34%) and one in two (49%) Somali migrants are receiving social assistance benefit.

Women, people aged over 45 years and first-generation migrants are overrepresented among social assistance benefit recipients. More than half the older members of the Afghan (52%) and Iraqi (56%) group are on social assistance benefit, and the figure for older migrants of Somali origin is almost two-thirds (64%). The number of migrants on social assistance benefit has increased again since the start of the economic crisis. This contrasts with the first years of this century (2000-2008), when the share of people in receipt of benefit declined sharply.

Income of non-Western migrants a third lower than Dutch natives


The incomes of non-Western migrants are almost a third lower than those of Dutch natives. The average annual household income of non-Western migrants is 18,300 euros, compared with 25,500 euros for Dutch native households. Migrants of Surinamese origin have the highest average incomes (21,100 euros), followed by those of Iranian background (19,500 euros). The income position of the other refugee groups is substantially worse; Somali households have to manage on an average annual income of 12,200 euros – less than half the income of Dutch natives and also a third less than the income of the total group of non-Western migrants. The average income of non-Western migrants had been improving since the start of this century, but has been in decline since 2007. Compared with Dutch natives, migrants have lost a relatively larger share of their income.

Poverty

One in five non-Western migrants, and one in four non-Western children, live in a poor household; the comparable figures for Dutch natives are substantially smaller (5% and 7%, respectively). The poverty figures reflect the labour market position of the various groups. Poverty is greatest in the Somali, Afghan, Iraqi and Moroccan groups. If we look at the share of children from these groups living in poor households, the percentages are even higher.

Figure S.5

Share of persons (total and children) living in poor households, by ethnic origin, 2011^a (in percentages)



Source: CBS

Group profiles

The labour market position of the different migrant groups varies widely, as can be deduced from the preceding description of indicators of labour market and income position. In this section we switch perspective by taking the individual groups as a starting point. It is important here to remember the differences in the group sizes. The Turkish group comprises almost 400,000 persons, the Moroccan group roughly 370,000 and the Surinamese group nearly 350,000. Iraqis are the biggest refugee group in the Netherlands, at around 54,000, followed by Afghans (around 42,000), Iranians (35,000) and Somalis (35,000). Table S.3 summarises the positions of the migrant groups on a number of socioeconomic indicators.

Just over half the *Turkish group* are in work. This group is characterised by a relatively high proportion of self-employed people, and the high proportion of people working in elementary and low-skilled jobs is also striking. The participation rate of Turkish women increased by seven percentage points between 2001 and 2012. The unemployment rate is the same in the Surinamese and Antillean groups. Traditionally, Turkish and Moroccan migrants have been treated in the Netherlands as if they were virtually the same thing. There is less and less reason to do this: the Turkish group has a higher net participation rate, lower unemployment and fewer social assistance benefit claimants than the Moroccan group. On the other hand, the share of Turkish and Moroccan households living below the poverty line is comparable; it may be that this is due to self-employed people and people working in low-skilled jobs who earn too little to take them above the poverty line.

Among the four largest non-Western groups, those of *Moroccan* background present the weakest picture. Fewer than half of Moroccan migrants aged between 15 and 65 years are in paid work and youth unemployment is very high, especially among those who have left senior secondary vocational education without a basic qualification. Moroccans are also the group where unemployment has risen fastest in the Netherlands in recent years. Many members of the Moroccan group receive social assistance benefit and poverty is widespread. One positive note is the increased number taking up higher-level occupations. This means that the spread in occupations is widening: in addition to a substantial proportion who do not work, are unemployed or work in low-grade, flexible jobs, the share of the Moroccan group at higher job levels is also increasing.

The *Surinamese group* is characterised by a high female labour participation rate, which is not much below that of native Dutch women. The rate of youth and adult unemployment is comparable with that of the Turkish and Antillean groups. Migrants of Surinamese origin are more likely to be employed in middle-ranking and senior positions than their Turkish and Moroccan counterparts. Compared with the three other large minority groups, Surinamese households are least likely to be below the poverty threshold, though the number that are is still twice as high as among native Dutch households. In the 1980s and 90s, the *Antillean group* presented a fairly positive picture. The changed migratory flow from the Antilles means this has not been the case for some time now. Unlike the other large migrant groups, there was virtually no increase between 2001 and 2012 in the share of this group working at higher occupational levels. Although a substantial proportion of the Antillean group are still to be found in middle-ranking and higher-level occupations, the share in a vulnerable labour market position has grown in recent years (table S.3).

Table S.3

Position of migrant groups on socioeconomic indicators, 2012 (in percentages)

	net participation rate	unemploy- ment	youth unem- ployment (15-24 years)	elementary/ low occupa- tion level	social assistance benefit	poverty ^a
non-Western total,						
of whom	53	16	28	42	12	19
Turkish	52	15	26	54	9	20
Moroccan	46	20	37	45	14	23
Surinamese	61	14	27	35	9	10
Antillean	57	16	28	36	12	16
other non-Western,						
of whom	52	15	25	40	15	22
Afghan	42	21	.	56	24	32
Iraqi	39	20	.	31	34	36
Iranian	60	13	.	27	20	19
Somali	26	37	.	.	49	53
native Dutch	70	5	10	28	2	5

a According to 'modest but adequate' criterion; poverty figures 2011.

. Data not available.

Source: CBS

The *Somali group* are in a very weak economic position: a quarter of them are in work; 37% are unemployed; half are on social assistance benefit. The poverty rate is exceptionally high: more than half the Somali group in the Netherlands and two-thirds of children live in a household with an income below the poverty line.

Among the refugee groups, the *Iranian group* are in the most favourable position. Their net participation rate is much higher and unemployment rate much lower, though still stands at 13%. In addition, a striking number of Iranian employees work at a high occupation level. There are also many self-employed Iranians. The Iranian group resembles the Surinamese group in terms of labour participation and unemployment rate, though one key difference is the high proportion of the Iranian group in receipt of social assistance benefit – something that characterises all four refugee groups studied here.

The *Afghan and Iraqi groups* resemble each other on key labour market and income indicators. They are in a predominantly unfavourable position: fewer than half are in work and roughly a fifth of the labour force are unemployed. They are heavily dependent on social assistance benefit, particularly those of Iraqi origin. Many migrants of Afghan origin are self-employed.

Box S.2 Labour market position of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe

The emphasis in this report is on the position of non-Western migrants in the Netherlands. There are two reasons for the reduced attention for the position of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. In the first place, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research/scp recently published a study specifically focusing on Poles and Bulgarians (Gijssberts & Lubbers 2013). Second, the sources used here, and in particular the Labour Force Survey (EBB), provide only partial information on these groups. Migrants who intend to spend less than four months in the Netherlands are not required to have their details entered in the Municipal Personal Records Database (GBA), and are not covered by surveys such as the EBB.

Since a substantial proportion of EU labour migrants are not entered in the GBA, it is difficult to obtain an overall picture of their labour market position. The Labour Force Survey shows that the net participation rate of Poles is 65%, the unemployment rate 10%, and that half are in elementary or low-skilled jobs. A study of Poles who are entered in the GBA and who have lived in the Netherlands for less than six years (Dagevos 2011) produced comparable figures, albeit slightly higher for both the net participation rate (69%) and unemployment (13%). Studies which recruit respondents in places where lots of EU migrants live and work (e.g. Weltevrede et al. (2009) and Engbersen et al. (2011a, 2011b), show that almost all Polish labour migrants are in work. To a greater extent than the studies on migrants who are entered in the GBA, these are temporary and circular labour migrants who intend to return to Poland after a relatively short period spent working in the Netherlands.

The labour participation rate of Bulgarians appears to be less favourable than that of Poles, according to figures from the EBB (net participation rate 58%, unemployment rate 14%). The study of recently migrated Bulgarians by Gijssberts and Lubbers suggests a low participation rate for Bulgarian women (36%), while 67% of men are in work. This is much lower than the figures for the Polish group in this study. The position of Bulgarians of Turkish extraction is particularly weak: the percentage in work is relatively low (47%), and most of those who do have work are in low-paid and often flexible jobs. Many Turkish Bulgarians have a low education level.

The labour market position of Romanians appears to be better than that of Bulgarians. According to the EBB, 65% have paid jobs and 14% of the Romanian labour force are unemployed. Other research also suggests that Romanians are in a somewhat better labour market position than Bulgarians (Mars et al. 2012; Engbersen 2011b).

Women on the labour market after changes in family situation

One in five Turkish and Moroccan women in the Netherlands give up work after marrying

Roughly one in ten native Dutch women give up work after getting married, roughly similar to women of Surinamese and Antillean origin. In the Turkish and Moroccan groups, roughly 20% of women stop working when they marry. It is striking that this percentage is no lower in the second generation than in the first. Moreover, the percentage of Turkish and Moroccan women in both generations who give up work after getting married shows a clear increase, which is not found in the other migrant groups.

Substantial but declining proportion of Turkish and Moroccan migrant women give up work completely after having a child

Having children is a reason for giving up work much more often than getting married. 29% of women of Turkish origin and 25%, of those of Moroccan background give up work completely after having their first child. 11% of women of Surinamese origin do this, while the figure for those of Antillean background is 13% and for native Dutch women 8%. Women from migrant groups thus give up work more often than native Dutch women. On the other hand, the figure – despite the deteriorating economic climate – is clearly falling, especially among women of Turkish and Moroccan origin.

Non-Western women who carry on working more often work more hours after having a child

A substantial proportion of women do not give up working completely when they have a child, but cut their hours. It is striking that native Dutch women begin working part-time much more often than women of non-Western origin. In fact, women in the latter group who carry on working actually increase their working hours after the birth of their child more often than native Dutch women.

Frequent re-entry to the labour market, especially by women of Surinamese origin

A high proportion of non-Western women rejoin the labour market some years after having their first child. This is especially true of women of Surinamese origin, almost half of whom return to work – more than the figure for native Dutch women, just under 40% of whom rejoin the labour market. The number of female re-entrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin is around 30%. Re-entry to the labour market is more common in the second than the first generation.

Women with a migrant background advance more after re-entering the labour market than native Dutch women

Women with a migrant background derived more 'profit' from re-entering the labour market than native Dutch women. They more often start earning more than before they had children, and less often earn less than native Dutch women. This is probably because they more often start working longer hours, but also because they often obtain a better paid job after rejoining the labour market. They are therefore catching up on native Dutch women, who often earned more before the birth of their first child. The differences found are considerable: 40-45% of women of Turkish and Moroccan origin re-entering the labour market see their wages increase substantially, compared with only 25% of native Dutch re-entrants. Antillean women make the most progress after re-entry: 50% earn substantially more.

Labour market position and bonding with Dutch society

According to many indicators, migrants are in a weak position on the labour market. We investigated whether there is a relationship between a weak labour market position and what we describe as bonding with Dutch society. The underlying idea is that a weak

position might be associated with withdrawal by migrants into their own group and could give rise to dissatisfaction about the social climate towards migrant groups in the Netherlands.

The outcomes present a mixed picture. Jobseekers and people without work who do not participate in the jobs market more often maintain contacts predominantly with members of their own group, and jobseekers identify with their own origin group more than migrants in other labour market positions. Jobseekers feel less at home in the Netherlands, and jobseekers, jobless and working migrants in low-skilled, temporary jobs appreciate Dutch society less than people in better occupational positions. These outcomes do therefore suggest an association between disadvantage on the labour market and distance from the host society (statistically controlled in each case for factors including education, command of the Dutch language, age, sex and health status). However, the variation between the different labour market positions is not great. Other factors apart from labour market position are also important: command of Dutch, education level and generation also explain much of the behaviour and orientation towards the host society.

Additionally, a diversity of labour market positions says little about how migrants assess the social climate towards migrant groups. Those working in senior positions are no different from jobseekers here; migrants in both categories express the same views on opportunities for and attitudes towards migrant groups in the Netherlands. The negative opinion of migrants at the upper end of the occupational ladder suggests an integration paradox: people in good positions are less positive in their view of the social climate in the Netherlands towards migrant groups. This integration paradox also manifests itself in the relationship with education level; highly skilled migrants and those with a command of the Dutch language are generally rather more negative in their views on interethnic relations in the Netherlands.

Conclusions and policy implications

The economic crisis has had a deep impact on the labour market position of migrant groups in the Netherlands. Unemployment, which was already high, has risen sharply and has particularly affected young migrants. Migrant youth unemployment is now approaching 30%, its highest level this century. The increase in the share of working migrants came to a halt in around 2008, since when it has been declining. The gap relative to Dutch natives has widened again in recent years, and on balance the share of working non-Western migrants in 2012 was back to the same level as in 2001. Migrant groups are thus exceptionally sensitive to economic developments. The unemployment rate, in particular, shows wide fluctuations. The duration of the crisis will therefore largely determine whether and how far unemployment continues rising.

Apart from the fact that young people are often unemployed, young working migrants are also often forced to work in flexible jobs. Permanent jobs for young people are gradually becoming the exception; roughly two-thirds of migrant groups are on flexible employment contracts. In fact this also applies for more than half of young Dutch natives.

Differences in education level by no means tell the whole story in explaining disadvantage on the labour market. Not that education is unimportant: people with a higher education level are less often unemployed, participate more often in the jobs market and at a higher level. But education and other human capital factors such as disciplines studied, experience and unemployment history are only partially responsible for the differences in the unemployment rates between migrant and native groups. The same applies for the differences in youth unemployment and for the overrepresentation of migrant groups in flexible jobs. These are conclusions that stem from analyses of the labour force and of recent graduates. Migrants with the same characteristics as natives have less chance of finding (permanent) work, suggesting that other factors than those included in the analyses play a role. Those factors could be related to the intensity and efficiency of the jobseeking behaviour by (young) migrants. Discrimination is also a factor; several recent studies have shown that an applicant's ethnic background plays a role in selection decisions (Andriessen et al. 2010; 2012). When job application letters or visitors to a temporary employment agency are assessed, the group to which they are regarded as belonging matters. Migrants thus have a wider gulf to bridge than Dutch natives.

The differences in occupation level and salary can be much more readily explained by characteristics such as education and age. It would therefore appear that pre-entry discrimination is more important on the Dutchman labour market than post-entry discrimination. All in all, the dominant picture of the present labour market and income position of migrants is negative. However, there are a few bright spots. One is the low occurrence of post-entry discrimination. Another is the increased occupational level of migrant groups; the difference between second-generation migrants and Dutch natives in the share of working people with a senior or academic occupation is no longer wide. Despite the economic crisis, the labour participation rate of migrant women has risen over the last ten years. One factor here is the fall in the share of women from migrant groups who give up work after the birth of a child. A substantial proportion of women with children moreover reappear on the labour market.

Policy: structural integration back on the agenda

In the 1990s, integration policy was synonymous with combating the socioeconomic disadvantage of migrant groups. In subsequent years there was a shift in emphasis away from structural integration towards sociocultural issues. However, this report demonstrates that the problems in relation to the structural position of migrant groups have anything but disappeared. The findings presented show that economic developments exert a major influence on the labour market position of migrants. Strengthening their education level and improving their command of Dutch increase their opportunities and make migrants more resilient to economic shocks. This report shows, for example, that dropping out of school early leads to high unemployment figures. Continuing the policy aimed at reducing school dropout is therefore extremely important. Lower-skilled migrants are extra vulnerable during times of economic difficulty. This report also shows that students from migrant groups have difficulty finding internships. It goes almost without saying that internships are very important, both for completing a course of study and for finding work.

At the same time, this report makes clear that general disadvantage factors can only partially explain the observed differences in unemployment and flexible jobs. Pursuing exclusively general (disadvantage) policy will therefore not be enough to eliminate the gap between migrants and labour demand fully. The heart of the policy should consist in bridging that gap. This might include efforts to improve jobseeking behaviour and job application skills. A project was recently initiated by the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands (SER) aimed at linking together networks of migrants and employers, involving the deployment of mentors from industry and from migrant groups (SER 2013). Measures such as these can help close the gap between the demand for labour and the migrant labour supply. There are also impediments on the demand side; for example, discrimination impedes the influx of jobseekers from migrant groups. This is often due to statistical discrimination, whereby (negative) images of migrant groups influence decisions about individual jobseekers from those groups. Selection decisions are not ethnically neutral; prejudices play a role. Thinking critically about possible impediments in the usual methods of recruitment and selection could make a big contribution to increasing the number of migrants taken on. Diversity policy provides a framework within which such activities could take place. The framing of such a policy is clearly different from the old target groups policy, involving a shift from social to commercial considerations and from quotas and target groups to emphasising the economic importance of diversity of individuals. The flipside of diversity policy is that it is not always binding and often does not get beyond good intentions. However, structurally involving the demand side of the labour market is a necessary condition for reducing the high rate of unemployment in migrant groups.

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